I was trying to buy the Speedy token on Spooky.fi however after numerous attempts my MetaMask wallet couldn’t connect for some reason then in the search bar a small icon popped up and I clicked on it and it prompted me to impo my wallet to procee. As soon as I imported my wallet the transaction went through. I didn’t think anything of it at first. A few hours later my MetaMask wallet was drained. All of my tokens balances were shown 0.00 The scammer used a malicious malware to trick people.

I sent my eth from binance to metamask using optimism network and my metamask account is already connected to data ownership protocol to claim my airdrop tokens they gave but when the withdrawal is completed from binance it immediately comes in and out when i contact on the metamask they tell me the situation that i recieve the deposit amount but it immediately transferred to three different addresses but I didn't sent any . But my account is connected to g dop.org to claim my airdrop I think they stole my funds.

These are the transaction hashes that took my 2000 USDT and 100USD worth at the time of BNB

I connected my wallet to a scam site and it started to drain all of my stETH and ETH. I still have 7 days to prevent them from taking my stETH in Eigen Layer so I am desperate to try to get help and stop this. Please help. My email is sbrudzewski@gmail.com

As I have used DeBridge web to perform bridging between USDT/AVAX to buy EigenLayer/BNB ,I have been scammed. I have paid 266.76925 USDT to get 600,484,353.909851246 of EigenLayer ,but never received. upon contacting DeBridge support ,them been unable to sort it out. I am convinced that them scammed me as them been a middle men that done swap between chains. all proofs in attachments. So far as well reported to MetaMask as I have used their wallet to sync with app.debridge.finance

https://etherscan.io/tx/0xfd42a3810f4c913236f22ed6d978d6793e3a634b0e4817240c2fa771c49678f6#eventlog https://etherscan.io/address/0x9e72f98a88416e0291965260e36e003b7444e915#code https://dexscreener.com/ethereum/0x4d43fc09d36c718bcd95c4a2195c862d53c58fc7

seem like he made many new address and this wallet drain my omni token and many other

PolyBridge contract exploiter

Sweeped my MM wallet. Goes by BEAVERBUILD and it appears scams are constant monitoring that on etherscan.io

The scammer stole my Metamask wallet private key and then stole all my assets

Hi guys. I'm honestly having a breakdown right now. Believe me, I'm aware of those honeypot scams. I usually try my best to buy and sell a token first with a super small amount (2 usd as shown) before I completely invest. For some reason, after fully investing my amount, I wasn't able to transfer / sell already my coin. I'm really begging for any help that can be provided to me. 180 usd might be small to you guys but this is really hard-earned money by me. I spent days and weeks just to earn that. I don't know how the scammers did it but I just can't do anything as of the moment. It keeps failing when I transfer it (internal json error), also fails when I try to sell it. I really hope you guys can help me. I'm seriously begging for anyone.

After purchasing, I am completely unable to transfer or swap these tokens. I have attempted to send both of these tokens to myself from Metamask to Metamask, or MM to Trust, no avail. Using KyberSwap and Uniswap throws JSON-RPC errors within Metamask. Inspecting these contracts, there's some suspicious details. They both have copy/pasted implementations which are broken: The _transfer function: The _transfer function internally calls the dfggeee function, which in turn calls the _base100 function of the GsRFGRRjsd interface. However, the implementation of this interface is not provided in the contract code. Without knowing what the _base100 function does, it's difficult to determine if it could introduce any issues during token transfers. The dfggeee function is called with the from address, the to address (converted using getsssferucko(_sdf33u)), and the amount. The _sdf33u variable is derived from the to address using uint(uint160(to)). This conversion and passing of addresses to an unknown external function (_base100) could potentially lead to unexpected behavior or vulnerabilities. Balance manipulation: After calling the dfggeee function, the _transfer function performs a suspicious balance manipulation: solidityCopy codeuint256 fromBalance =10000 + xsdf45 -10000; The xsdf45 variable is obtained from the dfggeee function, but its purpose is unclear. Adding and subtracting 10000 seems arbitrary and could potentially manipulate the token balances in unexpected ways.

Someone, somehow gained access to my Metamask wallet, then my AAVE Token and ETH Token have been taken out from the AAVE protocol, have been swapped to USDT and have been sent to the scammers address.

Saw a whitelisting message for a project called masked on Twitter In the replies there was an account using the same name as the project side and with a lot of followers, posting a registration whitelisting address I connected to this site and all my DEGEN was stolen.

Beluga Dex is a fork of Wombat / Platypus that, as early of October 2023, was running on Arbitrum and had above USD300k of TVL. The protocol had three pools: - a USDC/USDT/DAI pool - an overnight pool DAI+/USD+/USDC - a LST pool Around July 2023, the team started to disappear from all social media (Discord, Telegram) Exploit #1: On October 13th, the USDC/USDT/DAI “Beluga Dex” protocol was exploited for USD175k worth of stables (USDT, USDC, DAI). The dev team did not react or communicate. https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x57c96e320a3b885fabd95dd476d43c0d0fb10500d940d9594d4a458471a87abe However, right after the hack was made public, the deployer froze the protocol, including the Overnight and LST pools that were NOT exploited. There is very strong belief, supported by on-chain behaviour, that the protocol was hacked by the developing team themselves, but didn’t drain all pools to make it look like the hack was coming from a third party. Exploit #2: After this, the contracts have been updated by the deployer, creating a fishing for all assets that had been previously approved by the users. For instant the modified contract “fished” this wallet for circa 20 wstETH in early February 2024 as seen on this transaction: https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xe317b70ed1c43bbcb2cfd4f574605975850b884e8a6e8c9fb741e5e8da617151 What is interesting is that this hacker wallet has been funded with ETH tokens to execute the contracts by this wallet: https://arbiscan.io/address/0xaec726ffd9fd3fbd2a08a452125e4caeb5d0c4d2 This wallet itself has been funded ETH and had multiple interaction with this wallet https://arbiscan.io/address/0x3842f081d592ee512cd5a4556a64fc3bca666e8c. Below are a couple of transactions between both wallet: - https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xa593b1c1d7bd55ac1cfa386200c753e1d01c7a39af12de993d2fbc6c62eafce1 - https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x2c97ec4e22c8c9eec134e57a87f87a707299b1b983356b9c596e81d213f2017d - https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x13b0ce7a94bfb3902f43b20fbf47e965462da6fd586519c2684bc71ab6668b33 This particular wallet has laundered money with with Tornado Cash, has been sending a significant amount Beluga protocol $BELA Tokens ($379k worth of transactions) in and out, and given the volume of exchanges of BELA tokens, seems to one of the dev wallet as being associated with the contract deployer of the protocol. Some of the proceeds generated by this very likely “dev wallet” have been sent to this wallet https://arbiscan.io/address/0xb23eb0e1b93551e1c652351cddac51c3ceae3e28 and then sent to Binance over smaller transactions as USDC or USDT such as: - https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xe79273b16bd442975b035fdcbb70e29a2f147f2ccfc18c9f5a7b4431e2a27354 - https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x965be2ac4794e260d3a58c8a7a94ce0d9a4a9e13f905510246221f42976e6045